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March 2007 saw an increase of 3.1 percent in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) annual inflation rate and triggered the first explanatory letter from the 
Governor of the Bank of England to the Chancellor of the Exchequer since the 
Bank of England was granted operational independence in May 1997.  The 
letter gave rise to a lively debate on whether policymakers should pay 
attention to the link between inflation and M4 money growth.  Using UK data 
since the introduction of inflation targeting in October 1992, we show that: (i) the 
relationship between inflation and M4 growth is not stable over time, and (ii) the 
tendency of M4 to exert inflationary pressures is conditional on annual M4 
growth exceeding 10%. Above this threshold, a 1 percentage point increase in 
the annual growth rate of M4 increases annual inflation by only 0.09 percentage 
points, whereas a 1 percentage point increase in the disequilibrium between 
money and its long-run determinants increases annual inflation by only 0.07 
percentage points.  Since the money effects are very small, the implication is 
that the Monetary Policy Committee should not be particularly worried for not 
paying close attention to M4 money movements when setting interest rates. 
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March 2007 saw an increase of 3.1 percent in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) annual inflation rate and triggered the first explanatory letter from 
Mervyn King (Governor of the Bank of England) to Gordon Brown (Chancellor 
of the Exchequer) since the Bank of England was granted operational 
independence in May 1997. 
1 The letter gave rise to a lively debate on 
whether policymakers should pay attention to the link between inflation and 
M4 broad money growth.  For instance, in a recent letter to the Financial 
Times  (dated 24 April 2007), Prof Tim Congdon along with eight other 
Professors and practitioners (including former external Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) member Prof Charles Goodhart) warned of a high risk of 
inflation following recent annual M4 growth rates in double digits.  The letter 
was not left unchallenged.  Sushil Wadhwani (former external MPC member) 
wrote in the Times (on 30 April 2007) that there is no reliable stable 
relationship between inflation and M4 and hinted that the open letter of 
explanation should become thing of the past.  Current external MPC member 
David Blanchflower (during his Bernard Corry Memorial Lecture on 30 May 
2007) repeated that the relationship between inflation and M4 is not constant 
over time and added that despite not targeting M4, the Bank of England will 
continue to monitor and analyse M4 developments.   
  Clearly, the effect of high M4 growth on inflation is at the centre of policy-
making thinking in the UK and we contribute to this debate by quantifying the 
nature of the relationship since the introduction of inflation targeting in October 
1992.  Our main findings are summarised as follows. The relationship between 
UK inflation and M4 growth is indeed not stable over time.  This should not be 
interpreted as evidence that UK inflation is unrelated to M4 movements.  In fact, 
allowing for a more sophisticated model (in the form of regime-switching 
behaviour between “low” and “high” rates of money growth), this paper is able to 
quantify a time-varying relationship between UK inflation and money.  In 
particular, the tendency of M4 to exert inflationary pressures is conditional on 
annual M4 growth being higher than the 10% threshold, which is endogenously 
determined by our model.  Above this threshold, a 1 percentage point increase 
                                                 
1 The Governor of the Bank of England must write an open letter of explanation if inflation 
deviates from the 2% target by more than 1%.    2 
 
 
in the annual growth rate of M4 triggers a mere 0.09 percentage points increase 
in annual inflation, whereas a 1 percentage point increase of money above 
equilibrium increases inflation by only 0.07 percentage points.  At the same 
time, the inflation effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the output gap is 
five times as much as the money effects above.  The M4 effects are too small to 
justify claims that recent M4 movements (above the historical average of 8%) 
are highly inflationary.  The implication is that the MPC do not need to be 
particularly worried for not paying close attention to money movements when 
setting interest rates. 
  The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model, 
discusses data issues and reports the main estimates.  Section 3 reports 
estimates based on alternative measures of the data and specifications and 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Model, data and estimates 
Recent models of UK inflation include Castle and Hendry (2007), Hendry 
(2001), Arghyrou et al (2005), Osborn and Sensier (2004), and Clements and 
Sensier (2003). The latter three studies consider nonlinear models but do not 
address the issues discussed in the current paper. 
  To test the existence of a meaningful relationship between CPI inflation 
and M4 growth 
2, we use UK quarterly data between 1992q4 and 2007q1 and 
begin by estimating a standard backward-looking linear Phillips curve equation 
augmented by M4 monetary effects: 
3  
 
(1)  40 4 1 4 4 4 () () () 4 tp t g a p t m t d i s e q t t p L p L gap L m diseq u β ββ β β −− Δ=+ Δ + + Δ + + , 
 
where  t p  is the log CPI price level,  44 ttt p pp − Δ =−  is the CPI annual 
inflation rate,  4t m  is the log M4  level,  44 444 ttt mmm − Δ =−  is the annual 
growth in M4 money, and gap is the output gap (given by the residuals from 
                                                 
2  M4 consists of M3 (i.e. notes and coins in circulation with the public and sterling bank 
deposits held by UK residents) plus building society deposits again in sterling held by UK 
residents. 
3 The dataset comes from the National Statistics Online database, see: 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/tsdlistfiles.asp   3 
 
 
regressing log real output on a quadratic trend).   () p L β ,  () gap L β  and  4() m L β  
are polynomials in the lag operator L, and the stochastic error term 
2 ~. .. ( 0 , ) tu ui i dσ . In (1), lagged inflation terms proxy forward-looking 
expectations or rigidities in the wage price relationship resulting in lagged 
adjustment (see e.g. Blanchard, 1988). 
4  
  The money disequilibrium (diseq) is constructed as the residuals from 
the Engle and Granger (1987) long-run regression: 
 
(2)  4 0.31 1.05 1.24 2.98 tt t t t diseq m p y R =−− − + , 
 
where  t y  is the log level of real output,  t R  is the 3-month Treasury bill and the 
rest of the variables have been defined above.  The money disequilibrium is 
stationary at the 5% level. 
5 To examine the robustness of our results to 
alternative specifications, the money disequilibrium (diseq) has also been 
estimated using a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model with four lags in  4t m , 
t p ,  t y  and  t R .  The empirical results are consistent with the estimates 
reported in (2) above. 
6 
7 
  Figure 1 plots together CPI inflation, annual M4 growth, the output gap, 
and the diseq variable, whereas Table 1 reports M4,  CPI,  gap and diseq 
                                                 
4 For other versions of the Phillips curve (including a forward looking one) see e.g. Neiss and 
Nelson (2005). We return to this in Section 3 below. 
5 The ADF test statistics are ADF(0 lag)= -1.97, ADF(1 lag)= -2.11, ADF(2 lags)= -2.22, 
ADF(3 lags)= -2.28, ADF(4 lags)=-2.17.  The 5% critical value is equal to 1.94. 
6 To account for our small sample, Johansen’s (1988, 1995) λ-max and trace test statistics 
use a small sample correction (for exact mathematical formulas, see e.g. Doornik and 
Hendry, 2000, p.282).  Both tests support the existence of one cointegrating relationship (p-
value for λ-max = 0.00; p-value for trace = 0.00 using critical values from MacKinnon et al., 
1999).  Normalising on  4t m , we estimate the coefficient on  t p  at 1.11, the coefficient on  t y  
at 1.27, and the coefficient on  t R  at –2.22 (with standard errors equal to 0.235 for  t p , 0.162 
for  t y , and 0.60 for  t R , respectively). Allowing for a linear deterministic trend in the 
cointegrating vector brings the coefficients on  t p  and  t y  down to 0.95, and 0.77, 
respectively, whereas the coefficient on  t R  is estimated at –1.01.  The correlations between 
this latter cointegrating vector (allowing for a trend) and those from the Engle-Granger method 
reported in (2) and the Johansen one without the trend are 0.94 and 0.97, respectively. 
7 Calza and Sousa (2003) review the long-run relationship among broad money, prices, 
output and the interest rate in the Euro area and elsewhere, whereas Hendry (2001) reports a 
money demand equation with unit coefficients on output and prices over the 1865-2000 
period.   4 
 
 
descriptive statistics.  The average M4 annual growth is 8%, whereas the 
average  CPI inflation rate is 1.8%, slightly below the 2% target. 
8 The 
correlation between annual M4 growth and CPI inflation is only 0.20.  Since 
2005, however, CPI inflation is higher than the 2% target, at the same time 
when  M4 growth exceeds its 8% average.  Since 2005, the disequilibrium 
(between money and its long-run determinants) and the output gap are both 
rising.  Indeed, the correlation between CPI inflation and the rest of the 
variables is stronger from 2005 onwards.  This has triggered a debate on 
whether the recent increases in M4 are highly inflationary and whether they 
have contributed to the March 2007 open letter of explanation.  This is related 
to the well-known view that inflation is a monetary phenomenon which goes 
back to Friedman’s Quantity Theory of Money. 
9 
Estimates of our preferred linear inflation model are reported in column 
(i) of Table 2.  Our preferred specification is: 
 
(3)  40 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 tp t g a p t m t d i s e q t t p p gap m diseq u β ββ β β −− − − Δ=+ Δ + +Δ + +  
 
This model was obtained from a specification search on a general model that 
included up to 4 lags of all variables and where the diseq variable was 
included at different lag lengths.  The estimates in column (i) of Table 2 show 
that inflation is highly persistent (with a coefficient estimate of 0.77) and the 
output gap variable is statistically significant with a coefficient estimate of 
0.14.  Both the M4 and diseq estimates are statistically significant and equal 
to 0.03.  The model, however, fails the parameter stability test. This is an 
indication that the relationship between CPI and M4 is not constant over time, 
and gives rise to the possibility that the relationship might be regime-switching 
between “low” and “high” rates of money growth (as hinted by some of the 
opposing arguments discussed in the Introduction).  If this is true, the 
estimated model should fail the linearity test.  We therefore test the estimated 
model in column (i) of Table 2 for the presence of non-linearities.  The last 
                                                 
8 The Bank of England targeted the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage interest payments 
(RPIX) before 2004. The target was set at 2.5%. We return to this in Section 3 below. 
9 In an excellent paper, Nelson (2007) uses extensive archival material from several countries 
to bring together information about Milton Friedman’s views on U.S. monetary policy.   5 
 
 
three rows of Table 2 report Hamilton’s (2001) λ-test, and the λA and g-tests 
proposed by Dahl and González-Rivera (2003).  Under the null hypothesis of 
linearity, these are Lagrange Multiplier test statistics following the χ
2  
distribution (a brief description of these tests is given in the Appendix of the 
paper)
 10.  These tests are powerful in detecting non-linear smooth transition 
behaviour (Dahl and González-Rivera, 2003). This is of particular interest as 
we shall use smooth transition specifications below.  All three tests reject 
linearity.  
  Having rejected linearity, we consider a possible regime-switching 
relationship between CPI inflation and M4 money. 
11 We consider, in turn, the 
possibility of regime-switching between “low” and “high” rates of money 
growth as well as the possibility of regime-switching between negative and 
positive deviations of money from its long-run equilibrium with prices, output, 
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Models (4) and (5) differ from the linear model (3) in that they allow for a 
regime-switching relationship between inflation and money growth depending 
on whether M4 grows above or below a certain thereshold value of 
4 m δ %, 
which is endogenously determined by the model.  In this model, the effect of 
annual  M4 growth on CPI inflation switches from  4
Low
m β  at “low” levels of 
                                                 
10 We run the tests using Gauss codes obtained from Hamilton’s web page at: 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jhamilto/software.htm#other. To account for the small sample, we 
report bootstrapped p-values of the three tests based on 1000 re-samples. 
11 Another possibility would be to specify a regime-switching model of inflation, which 
depends on positive versus negative values of the output gap. Clements and Sensier (2003) 
do not find such evidence in the UK.   6 
 
 
money growth (when annual M4 growth is below 
4 m δ %) to  4
High
m β at “high” 
levels of money growth (when annual M4 growth is above 
4 m δ %).  The model 
also allows for the diseq parameter to switch from 
Low
diseq β  at “low” levels of 
money growth to 
High
diseq β  at “high” levels of money growth; at the same time, 
the inflation persistence parameter switches from 
Low
p β  to 
High
p β  and the 
output gap parameter switches from 
Low
gap β  to 
High
gap β  (a specification search 
indicated using  1 t gap −  rather than  4 t gap −  in the the “high” money growth 
regime).   1 t θ −  refers to the probability that annual M4 growth in period t-1 is 
below 
4 m δ %.   
  The second regime-switching model we consider takes the form: 
 
(6) 
40 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 4
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Models (6)-(7) allow for a regime-switching relationship between inflation and 
money depending on whether disequilibrium deviations of M4 from its long-
run determinants are higher or lower than a certain threshold value of 
diseq δ %, which is again endogenously determined by the model.  We model 
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In (8)-(9), the smoothness parameters 
4 m γ , 
diseq γ > 0 determine the 
smoothness of the transition regimes.  We follow Granger and Teräsvirta 
(1993) and Teräsvirta (1994) in making 
4 m γ  and 
diseq γ  dimension-free by 
dividing the former by the standard deviation of annual M4 growth and the 
latter by the standard deviation of diseq.   
The results of models (4)-(5) reported in column (ii) of Table 2 show 
that when annual M4 growth is below 
4 m δ = 9.95%, its effect on inflation is 
equal to 0.05 and statistically significant.  The diseq effect is also equal to 
0.05 and statistically significant.  On the other hand, when annual M4 growth 
exceeds 
4 m δ = 9.95%, its effect rises to 0.09 and the diseq effect rises to 0.07.  
Therefore, when annual M4 growth exceeds the 10% threshold, a 1 
percentage point increase in the annual growth of M4 has the effect of 
increasing inflation by 0.09 percentage points, whereas a 1 percentage point 
increase in the disequilibrium between money and its long-run determinants 
has the effect of increasing inflation by 0.07 percentage points in the short 
run.  The output gap estimate switches from 0.16 at the “low” money growth 
regime to 0.49 at the “high” money growth regime; in the latter regime, a 1 
percentage point increase in the output gap increases inflation by five times 
as much as a 1 percentage point increase in either annual M4 growth, or 
money deviations from equilibrium. Interestingly, the inflation persistence 
parameter switches from 0.77 at the “low” money growth regime to 0.58 at the 
“high” money growth one; presumably the stronger response of inflation to 
money movements and the output gap (also at a shorter lag length for the 
latter), at higher levels of money growth makes the inflation variable less 
persistent.   
The estimated regime-switching model outperforms the model with 
constant parameters in column (i) in terms of diagnostic tests and there is no 
evidence of parameter instability (in contrast to the estimates in column (i)). 
The results of models (6)-(7) reported in column (iii) of Table 2 show 
that when disequilibrium deviations switch from negative to positive (notice 
that the threshold 
diseq δ  is insignificantly different from zero), the diseq effect 
on inflation drops from 0.09 to 0.07 (the latter effect is statistically   8 
 
 
insignificant), whereas the impact of annual M4 growth on inflation is invariant 
at 0.03.  In terms of diagnostics, the models in (6)-(7) offer only a slight 
improvement over the model with constant parameters (in terms of the 
parameter stability test) and are inferior to the regime-switching models in (4)-
(5). 
  Using the estimates of models (4)-(5) (in column (ii) of Table 2) as our 
preferred specification, the time-varying impact of annual M4 money growth 
on inflation is given by: 
 
(10)  14 1 4 (1 )
Low High
tm t m θβ θ β −− +−  
 
Figure 2 plots the time-varying impact of money together with annual M4 
growth, the threshold 
4 m δ = 9.95% and the CPI inflation rate.  Between 1992 
and 1996, low M4 growth triggers a money effect on inflation of 0.05.  The 
effect switches to 0.09 when M4 growth exceeds 9.95% in 1997-1998, and 
then drops back to 0.05 until 2005 when it rises again to 0.09 in line with the 
high M4 growth rates over the last part of the sample.  The transition between 
regimes is quite rapid as suggested by the large smoothness parameter 
estimate of 
4 m γ = 20.10. 
 
3. Robustness analysis 
We investigate the robustness of our results by estimating (i) a purely forward-
looking version of the linear model (3) in which lagged inflation  41 t p − Δ  is 
replaced by expected future inflation for period t+1,  41 tt Ep + Δ , and (ii) a 
“hybrid” Phillips curve (see e.g. Galì and Gertler, 1999) in which both lagged 
inflation and expected future inflation appear.  We replace expected future 
inflation with actual future inflation and estimate by GMM using lagged values 
as instruments.  The estimates reported in columns (i)-(ii) of Table 3 fail to 
identify any significant M4 effects; in the “hybrid” model, lagged and future 
inflation are found to have weights adding up to one.  Parameter stability and 
linearity tests do not indicate any evidence of regime-switching behaviour.   9 
 
 
We also consider a model where inflation is measured by RPIX (the 
measure targeted by the Bank of England until 2003).  Using RPIX, the 
money disequilibrium (diseq) constructed from the residuals of the Engle and 
Granger (1987) long-run regression is qualitatively similar to the earlier 
estimates reported for model (2).  Column (iii) of Table 3 reports estimates of 
the linear inflation model in (3).  These estimates identify a small, but 
nevertheless, statistically significant effect from money growth and the diseq 
variable (but an insignificant effect from the output gap).  The estimated model 
fails the linearity and parameter stability tests.  As can be seen in column (iv) 
of Table 3, the regime-switching models in (4)-(5) deliver an estimate of 
4 m δ =9.65% for the threshold parameter and again, very small estimates for 
the money growth and diseq parameters in both “low” and “high” money 
growth regimes.  In constrast to the estimates using CPI inflation, RPIX 
estimates suggest that inflation persistence is higher in the “high” money 
growth regime (possibly because the corresponding M4 money growth effect 
is insignificant).   
  Detrending output by a linear trend or a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter 
did not make any difference to the empirical results (these are available on 
request).  The time-varying relationship between inflation and M4 could be 
pursued even further by combining models (4)-(5) and (6)-(7) in a four-regime 
model to allow for (i) a regime of “low” money growth and negative money 
disequilibrium deviations (with probability  14 tt θ φ − − ), (ii) a regime of “low” 
money growth and positive money disequilibrium deviations (with probability 
14 (1 ) tt θ φ −− − ), (iii) a regime of “high” money growth and negative money 
disequilibrium deviations (with probability  14 (1 ) tt θ φ − − − ), and (iv) a regime of 
“high” money growth and positive money disequilibrium deviations (with 
probability  14 (1 )(1 ) tt θ φ −− −− ).  Such a model would be extremely demanding 
in the number of parameters to be estimated.  Given also the earlier evidence 
that models (6)-(7) were only marginally better than the linear model (3), we 





Using UK data since the introduction of inflation targeting in October 1992, this 
paper shows that the relationship between CPI inflation and annual M4 growth is 
not stable over time.  Following from this, and in order to address the issue of 
whether high M4 growth rates are inflationary, we adopt a regime-switching 
model and show that money growth movements are inflationary only when 
annual  M4 growth exceeds 10%.  In this “high” money growth regime, a 1 
percentage point increase in the annual growth of M4 can only generate a 0.09 
percentage points increase in UK inflation, at the same time when a 1 
percentage point increase of money above equilibrium increases inflation by 
only 0.07 percentage points in the short run.  Considering also that, in the 
“high” money growth regime, a 1 percentage point increase in the output gap 
increases inflation by five times as much as a 1 percentage point increase in 
either annual M4 growth, or money deviations from equilibrium, we conclude 
that the money effects are too small to justify worries that recent M4 movements 
(which are indeed above the 1992-2007 average of 8%) are highly inflationary.  
The implication is that the MPC do not need to be particularly worried about M4 
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Appendix: Non-linearity tests 
Hamilton’s (2001) λ-test and the λA and g-tests proposed by Dahl and 
González-Rivera (2003) assume that the conditional mean function of the 
dependent variable is stochastic and therefore unobservable or unknown to 
the econometrician.  The testing procedure is based on the regression 
 
(A.1)  yt = β0+x
′
t β1+λm(g⊗xt)+ error 
 
In (A.1), the conditional mean of the dependent variable is a function of a 
linear and a non-linear component.  The linear component is given by x
′
t β1 
where xt is a k-dimensional vector of the explanatory variables (excluding the 
intercept term).  The non-linear component is given by λm(g⊗xt), where m(.) 
is a k-dimensional system of random variables depending on the distance 
amongst the elements of the xt vector, and ⊗ denotes element-by-element 
multiplication.  The scalar λ proxies the contribution of the non-linear part to 
the conditional mean, whereas g is a k-dimensional vector capturing the 
curvature of the conditional mean.  The null hypothesis of linearity involves 
testing the null hypothesis H0:  λ
2 = 0 for the λ and λA tests and the null 
hypothesis H0:  g = 0k for the g-test.  These are Lagrange Multiplier test 
statistics following the χ
2  distribution (for more technical details see Hamilton, 
2001, and Dahl and González-Rivera, 2003). Dahl and González-Rivera 
(2003) report simulation evidence according to which (i) their tests are more 
powerful than Hamilton’s original test when the dimensionality of the model (in 
terms of parameters to be estimated) increases, and (ii) their tests are 
powerful in detecting smooth transition specifications.  The latter is important 
as the regime-switching models we consider in this paper are smooth 
transition-type models.  




Table 1: M4, CPI, output gap and diseq descriptive statistics 
  M4 annual growth  
(%) 








 8.00 (1992q4-2007q1) 
12.32 (2005q1-2007q1) 
 1.80 (1992q4-2007q1) 




 6.64 (2005q1-2007q1) 
Correlation 
between  
CPI and M4  
 0.20 (1992q4-2007q1) 
 0.51 (2005q1-2007q1) 
     
Correlation 
between  
CPI and  
output gap  
-0.37 (1992q4-2007q1) 
 0.50  (2005q1-2007q1) 
   
Correlation 
between  
CPI and diseq 
 0.55 (1992q4-2007q1) 
 0.77 (2005q1-2007q1) 
   




Table 2: Parameter estimates, 1992q4-2007q1 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
0 β     0.16 (0.16)    0.02 (0.23)    0.34 (0.20) 
p β     0.77 (0.06)     
gap β     0.14 (0.05)     
4 m β     0.03 (0.01)     
diseq β     0.03 (0.01)     
      
Low
p β       0.77 (0.08)    0.77 (0.07) 
Low
gap β       0.16 (0.06)    0.32 (0.09) 
4
Low
m β       0.05 (0.02)    0.03 (0.01) 
Low
diseq β       0.05 (0.02)    0.09 (0.02) 
High
p β       0.58 (0.18)    0.62 (0.11) 
High
gap β       0.49 (0.20)    0.04 (0.06) 
4
High
m β       0.09 (0.03)    0.03 (0.01) 
High
diseq β       0.07 (0.02)    0.07 (0.04) 
4 m δ       9.95 (0.02)   
4 m γ      20.10 (8.43)   
diseq δ         0.01 (0.03) 
diseq γ        15.01 (6.63) 
Adjusted R
2    0.80    0.82    0.80 
Regression standard 
error 
  0.27    0.23    0.26 
AR(4) (p-value)    0.57    0.58    0.59 
Het (p-value)    0.34    0.36    0.37 
Normality (p-value)    0.51    0.54    0.52 
Parameter stability (p-
value) 
  0.00    0.12    0.11 
λ-test (p-value)    0.02     
λA-test (p-value)    0.01     
g-test (p-value)    0.00     
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Column (i) reports the parameter 
estimates of (3) whereas column (ii) reports the parameter estimates of (4)-(5) and column (iii) 
reports the parameter estimates of (6)-(7) in the main text.  AR(4) is the Breusch-Godfrey 4rth 
order serial correlation F-test.  Het is the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey F-test for heteroskedasticity. 
Normality is the Jarque-Bera Chi-square test for normality.  Parameter stability is an F test of 
parameter stability (see Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994). The table also reports bootstrapped p-values 
of the λ, λA, and g tests based on 1000 re-samples.   
 




Table 3: Estimates based on alternative specifications and measures 
 (i) 
Model with 
41 tt Ep+ Δ  
(ii) 
“Hybrid” model 
(model with  41 t p − Δ  








0 β     0.37 (0.17)    0.10 (0.14)    0.65 (0.27)    0.57 (0.20) 
p β     0.82 (0.08)    0.48 (0.07)*     0.63 (0.08)   
gap β    -0.03 (0.06)    0.04 (0.07)    0.03 (0.05)   
4 m β    -0.01 (0.01)    0.01 (0.02)    0.02 (0.01)   
diseq β     0.02 (0.02)    0.01 (0.01)    0.03 (0.01)   
        
Low
p β           0.69 (0.06) 
Low
gap β           0.04 (0.05) 
4
Low
m β           0.04 (0.01) 
Low
diseq β           0.05 (0.02) 
High
p β           0.88 (0.06) 
High
gap β           0.29 (0.10) 
4
High
m β          -0.01 (0.02) 
High
diseq β           0.05 (0.02) 
4 m δ           9.65 (0.04) 
4 m γ          17.03 (7.98) 
diseq δ        
diseq γ        
Parameter stability 
(p-value) 
  0.06    0.05    0.03    0.12 
λ-test (p-value)    0.12    0.11    0.02   
λA-test (p-value)    0.11    0.06    0.01   
g-test (p-value)    0.09    0.08    0.01   
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.   
* Restricted coefficient estimate on  41 t p − Δ . The unrestricted estimates are: 0.43 (standard 
error=0.07) for  41 t p − Δ  and 0.50 (standard error=0.08) for  41 tt Ep + Δ .  The p-value that these 
weights sum up to one is equal to 0.32.  Parameter stability is an F test of parameter stability 
(see Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994). The table also reports bootstrapped p-values of the λ, λA, and 
g tests based on 1000 re-samples.   












1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
diseq CPI inflation rate




Note:  CPI inflation rate, 2% target, output gap, diseq, M4 growth and 8% 
average rate.   19 
 
 
























Note: The time-varying effect is equal to  14 1 4 (1 )
Low High
tm t m θβ θ β −− +− , using 
4
Low
m β =0.05 and  4
High
m β =0.09 (see the estimates in column (ii) of Table 2).  
 